Tulsa Law Review
Volume 24

Issue 2

Winter 1988

Abortion Waiting-Period Statutes: Hartigan v. Zbaraz and Justice
Anthony Kennedy's Impact on Future Decisions
Vicky Cooper Hale

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Vicky C. Hale, Abortion Waiting-Period Statutes: Hartigan v. Zbaraz and Justice Anthony Kennedy's Impact
on Future Decisions, 24 Tulsa L. J. 189 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol24/iss2/2

This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu.

Hale: Abortion Waiting-Period Statutes: Hartigan v. Zbaraz and Justice

NOTES AND COMMENTS
ABORTION WAITING-PERIOD STATUTES:
HARTIGAN v. ZBARAZ AND JUSTICE
ANTHONY KENNEDY'S IMPACT ON
FUTURE DECISIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1973, the Supreme Court held that the fundamental right of personal privacy1 is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to have
an abortion.2 Three years later, the Court extended the right to have an
1. Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention a right of privacy, the Supreme
Court has recognized in varying contexts that there is a constitutionally protected right of privacy.
As early as 1925, the Court held that a statute requiring children to attend public school was unconstitutional as impeding the "liberty of the parents" to control the rearing and education of their
children. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 519 (1925). In Griswold v. Connecticut, the
majority found a "penumbra" of protection in the Bill of Rights and held that the right of married
persons to use contraceptives was included in that penumbra. 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). Justice
Goldberg concurred, but found the right of privacy in the ninth amendment. Id. at 486-87. The
right of privacy was extended to single persons when the Court held in Eisenstadt v. Baird that the
right of the "individual" to make decisions concerning child bearing should be protected from unwarranted government intrusion. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). The right of privacy also includes "the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters" and the "interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). "This right of privacy .... founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action . . .is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153.
But this right is not absolute, and there are areas in which some state regulation is appropriate. Id. at
154. However, the regulation must be justified by a "compelling state interest" and be so "narrowly
drawn" that it fulfills only that legitimate interest. Id. at 155. The state has an important and legitimate interest in protecting the "potentiality of human life" which only becomes compelling at the
point of viability of the fetus (when the fetus is capable of "meaningful life outside the mother's
womb"). Id. at 162-63. At viability, the state may proscribe abortion altogether, except when necessary "to preserve the life or health of the mother." Id. at 163-64. The state also has an important
and legitimate interest in protecting the health of the pregnant woman, but that interest does not
become compelling until approximately the end of the first trimester. Id. at 162-63. Until that time,
the state may not interfere with the decision of a woman and her physician to have an abortion. Id.
at 164-66. See also City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983)
(invalidating as unduly burdensome those sections of abortion ordinance requiring parental consent,
informed consent, 24-hour waiting period, and requiring that second trimester abortions be performed in a hospital). The Court stated that Roe v. Wade does not mean that a state may never
regulate abortion in the early stages of pregnancy. Id. at 429-30. Regulations having no significant
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abortion to unmarried women under the age of eighteen.' Although the
right to procure an abortion is not unqualified, 4 the Supreme Court has
generally upheld the right of a minor woman to obtain an abortion without unjustified interference by the state.' In a per curiam decision, the
Court recently affirmed, in Hartigan v. Zbaraz,6 the decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals which held unconstitutional a portion of
an Illinois statute requiring that an unemancipated minor seeking an
abortion wait twenty-four hours after her physician had notified the minor's parents of her decision.7
Although Zbaraz is important for its confirmation of minors' abortion rights, its greatest significance lies in the fact that an equally divided
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals decision. The eight justices
of Zbaraz have since been joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy,8 and the
impact of his appointment upon privacy and abortion issues is yet unclear. However, an analysis of Kennedy's judicial philosophies and relevant Ninth Circuit opinions in conjunction with Hartiganv. Zbaraz may
lead to the conclusion that Justice Kennedy would join the four dissenters of Zbaraz and hold that the twenty-four hour waiting period imposed
by the Illinois Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1983 is constitutional.
impact on a woman's abortion right may be upheld so long as they further a state's important healthrelated concern and do not interfere with the woman's decision to have an abortion. Id. at 430.
3. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976).
4. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154.
5. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 491-92 (1983) (A state's interest
in protecting immature minors will sustain a parental consent requirement so long as there are alternative procedures); Akron, 462 U.S. 416, 439-40, 450-51 (1983) (A statute must provide a procedure
by which a minor can avoid a parental veto of her abortion decision; also, a state may not require a
woman to wait 24 hours to obtain an abortion after she has made an informed decision to have one.);
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) [hereinafter Bellotti If) (If a state requires parental consent, it must also provide alternative procedures for obtaining authorization.); Danforth, 428 U.S. at
74 (A state may not impose a blanket provision requiring consent of a parent or person in loco
parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy.).
But cf.H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding statute requiring parental notification of
immature, dependent minor).
6. 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987), affrg per curiam, 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985).
7. Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1545 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd per curiam, 108 S. Ct. 479
(1987).
8. Confirmed February 3, 1988, by a 97-0 vote of the United States Senate. Senate Approves
Anthony Kennedy for High Court, L.A. Daily J., Feb. 4, 1988 at 1, col. 6.
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II.
A.

STATEMENT OF

Zbaraz

Facts

The Illinois Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1983 (the Act)9 regulated the performance of an abortion on an unemancipated minor1" by
requiring that the girl's physician give actual notice1" to both of her par-

ents twenty-four hours before an abortion could be performed upon
her. 2 The waiting period was not required if the parents or guardian
had already been notified, and either accompanied the minor to the abortion facility or submitted signed, notarized statements indicating that
13
they had been notified of the abortion decision.
The Act also provided for a judicial alternative to parental notification if the minor objected to such notice being given. 14 The minor, on
her own behalf or by next friend, could petition the court for a hearing
and waiver of the notice requirement. If the court found either that the

minor was "mature and well-informed enough" to make her own decision, or that parental notice would not be in her "best interests," the
court was compelled to waive parental notification. 5 The Act required
that the court rule within forty-eight hours of the application and maintain a confidential record of the proceedings. 6 Furthermore, the Act
made available to the minor an opportunity to appeal an adverse ruling. 7
9. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, 81-61 to 81-70 (1983).
10. "Minors" are defined as "any person under the age of 18." Id. %81-63(a). Emancipated
minor is defined as "any minor who is or has been married or has by court order otherwise been
freed from the care, custody, and control of her parents." Id. %81-63(b). The Act also applied to
"incompetents." Id. 81-64.
11. "Actual" notice is defined as "giving of notice directly, in person or by telephone." Id. 8163(c). Notice could be waived if, in the best judgment of the physician, a medical emergency required an immediate abortion. Id. 81-66. Exceptions were also made for minors with divorced or
non-available parents or guardians. Id. at I 81-64(b). Furthermore, notice to the minor's father was
not required if her mother accompanied her and orally stated that she reasonably believed that the
fetus to be aborted was the child of the minor's father. Id. 81-67(b).
12. The Act states that:
No person shall perform an abortion upon an unemancipated minor. .. unless he or his
agent has given at least 24 hours actual notice to both parents or to the legal guardian of
the minor pregnant woman... of his intention to perform the abortion or unless he or his
agent has received a written statement or oral communication by another physician ...
certifying that the... physician or his agent has given such notice.

Id.

81-64(a).
13. Id. 81-67(a).
14. Id. 81-64(c).
15. Id. 81-65(d).
16. Id. 81-65(c).
17. Id. 81-65(f).
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Before the effective date of the Act, plaintiffs18 filed a class action
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois challenging the Act's constitutionality. The district court immediately issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the
issues.19 Four months later, the district court issued a memorandum
opinion declaring the twenty-four hour waiting period unconstitutional
as imposing an unjustifiable burden upon the effectuation of the minor's
abortion decision.2" The court found that the requirement increased the
cost of the procedure and could potentially result in a delay of more than
twenty-four hours because of the necessity of scheduling and making two
trips to the abortion facility. 1 The district court also held that the judicial alternative to parental notification was invalid because of its failure
to assure confidential and expeditious appellate proceedings for waiver of
the parental notice requirement. 2
Rather than severing the invalid provisions of the Act, 23 the court
granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and permanently enjoined enforcement of the entire Act. 4 Defendants appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
B.

Issues

On appeal,2 5 the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether the
twenty-four hour waiting period was an unconstitutional burden on the
right of a minor to have an abortion. The court also considered the constitutionality of the judicial alternative to parental notice in terms of
whether it 26assured a minor an expeditious and confidential waiver
proceeding.
18. The plaintiff class consisted of Drs. Allen G. Charles and David Zbaraz, representing themselves and all licensed physicians currently performing or desiring to perform abortions for unemancipated minors or disabled persons in Illinois, and on behalf of unemancipated minors capable of
giving informed consent to an abortion or whose best interest would not be served by giving notice to
both parents. The defendant class consisted of all State's Attorneys of all counties in Illinois.
Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 584 F. Supp. 1452, 1454 (N.D. Ill. 1984), order aff'd and vacated in part, 763
F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd per curiam, 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1459.
21. Id. at 1458.
22. Id. at 1460-62.
23. The court concluded that the invalidity of the two basic provisions of the Act left "little
remaining to sever which would have any operative significance." Id. at 1464.
24. Id. at 1467.
25. Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd per curiam, 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987).
26. The court also addressed the issue of severability and held that the constitutionally offensive
provisions pertaining to the waiting period could be severed from the Act without destroying its
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III.

A.

LAw PRIOR TO

Zbaraz

ParentalConsent Statutes

In PlannedParenthoodv. Danforth,27 the Supreme Court extended
the right of privacy to encompass a minor girl's decision to terminate a
pregnancy free from state interference.28 In so doing, the Court struck a
portion of a Missouri statute 9 requiring parental consent of an unmarried woman under the age of eighteen who sought an abortion during the
first twelve weeks of her pregnancy. °
Because the state has historically had greater latitude in regulating
the activities of children than of adults,31 the Court applied a less stringent level of scrutiny than the compelling state interest test used in Roe v.
Wade.32 Nevertheless, the Court rejected the argument that the state's
interest in safeguarding the family unit and parental authority was significant enough to condition an abortion on the consent of a parent or person in loco parentis.33 The Court stated that the minor's right of privacy
essential purpose. Id. at 1545. The court, therefore, vacated the district court's holding that the
entire Act was unconstitutional. Id.
27. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
28. Id. at 74. The Court also struck a provision requiring spousal consent prior to an abortion
and upheld a provision requiring informed and freely given written consent by the pregnant woman.
Id. at 67-69.
29. Mo. H. Bill No. 1211 § 3(4) (1974).
30. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. "[T]he State does not have the constitutional authority to give a
third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision" to terminate a pregnancy, and
therefore may not impose a blanket provision requiring parental consent as a condition to obtaining
an abortion. Id. This was the same rationale the Court used in striking down a spousal consent
provision of the same statute. Id. at 69.
31. Id. at 74-75 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (upholding state
child-labor statute over exercise of parental guardian control)). See also Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding conviction for selling pornography to a minor over first amendment
claims).
32. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Danforth Court looked to see if there was any "significant" state
interest to support the parental consent requirement. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75. See also Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (statute prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to minors
held unconstitutional). Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Carey, described the significant
state interest test, stating:
This test is apparently less rigorous than the 'compelling state interest' test applied to restrictions on the privacy rights of adults. Such lesser scrutiny is appropriate both because
of the States' greater latitude to regulate the conduct of children and because the right of
privacy implicated here is 'the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions,' and the law has generally regarded minors as having a lesser capability for
making important decisions.
Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 n.15 (citations omitted).
33. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. Providing a parent with absolute veto power is not likely to
strengthen the family, nor is it likely to enhance parental authority when the nonconsenting parent
and the pregnant minor are already in conflict over the abortion decision. Id. at 75. However,
Justice Stevens stated that the state's interest in protecting the welfare of minors justifies the imposition of restraints upon a minor's freedom that would be impermissible if applied to an adult, and a
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the parents may have in the termination
is greater than whatever interest
34

of their daughter's pregnancy.

Although the Court reaffirmed Roe v. Wade and extended privacy

protection to minors seeking abortions, it cautioned that its holding did
"not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give
effective consent for termination of her pregnancy.

' 35

Thus, the

Supreme Court acknowledged that limitations on a minor's right to obtain an abortion may exist, but it failed to implement a standard by

which a minor's consent would be deemed effective.

36
Three years after Danforth the Supreme Court, in Bellotti v. Baird

(Bellotti I), attempted to reconcile a woman's constitutional right of privacy in making an abortion decision with the special interests of the state
in protecting minors. 37 A plurality of the Court held that a state may

validly restrict a minor's access to abortion, but if it chooses to do so by
requiring that she obtain parental consent, the state must also provide an
alternative procedure by which she may obtain authorization and avoid
the undue burden of a third-party veto.38 In addition, the Court held

that the minor must have the opportunity to obtain judicial authorization
without first notifying her parents, 39 and the judicial proceedings must be
conducted anonymously and expeditiously.'
If the pregnant minor successfully demonstrates to a court that she
is "mature and well enough informed" to make an intelligent decision on

her own, or if the court determines that she is immature but that an
abortion would be in her "best interest," the court must authorize the
parental consent requirement furthers that interest by maximizing the possibility that the decision to
have an abortion is "made correctly and with full understanding of the consequences of either alternative." Id. at 102-03 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
34. Id. at 75.
35. Id.
36. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
37. The Court acknowledged three reasons for not equating the constitutional rights of a child
with those of an adult. Id. at 634. First is the minor's peculiar vulnerability. Id. While constitutional guarantees protect minors as well as adults from government deprivation, the state may adjust
its legal system to account for the special needs of the minor. Id. at 635. Second is the child's
inability to make informed decisions about important or critical matters, usually due to a lack of
experience or judgment. Id. Therefore, the state may validly restrict the minor's freedom of choice if
the matter has potentially serious consequences. Id. Third is the recognized right of parents to
direct the upbringing of their children. Id. at 637. Therefore, the state may impose upon minors legal
restrictions that are supportive of the parental role, such as requiring parental consent for certain
important decisions. Id. at 638-39.
38. Id. at 643.
39. Id. at 647.
40. Id. at 644.
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procedure without requiring that she consult with her parents. 4 1 If, however, the court finds otherwise, it may decline to authorize an abortion.4 2
Thus, the Bellotti II Court protected a minor's constitutional right to
choose, with her physician, whether to terminate her pregnancy, while
also protecting the state's important interest in encouraging parental consultation for immature minors and those whose best interests do not justify an abortion. Once again, however, the Court failed to provide a
standard by which the minor's maturity or best interests may be assessed.
B. ParentalNotice Statutes
The Court seemed to retreat from protecting a minor's right of privacy when it upheld, in H.L. v. Matheson,4 3 a statute requiring that a
physician notify, if possible, the parents of a dependent minor prior to
performing an abortion.' A divided Court held that the notification requirement satisfied the important state interests of preserving family integrity4 5 and protecting minors, while providing an opportunity for
parents to provide the physician with pertinent medical and psychological histories of the minor.4 6 The Court ruled that it did not need to determine the circumstances in which a state must provide an alternative to
parental notification.4 7 Although the Court acknowledged that the notice requirement may inhibit some minors from seeking an abortion, it
ruled that "[t]he Constitution does not compel a state to fine-tune its
statutes so as to encourage or facilitate abortions." 48 The state is also not
compelled to impose a waiting period to facilitate parental consultation
after notification.4 9
41. Id. at 647-48.
42. Id. at 648.
43. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
44. Id. at 413. The issue originally before the Court was whether the statute was unconstitutional on its face as overbroadly applying to all unmarried minor girls, including those who were
emancipated and mature. Id. at 405. The Court refused to address the broad question and narrowed
the issue by ruling that the plaintiff, as a dependent minor, had no standing to represent those minors
who were mature or emancipated. Id. at 406. The holding, therefore, applies only to those pregnant
minors who are dependent or immature.
45. Id. at 411. But see Note, HL. v. Matheson: Where Does the Court Stand on Abortion and
ParentalNotification?,31 AM. U. L. REV.431, 457 n.207 (1982). The Court "rejected 'safeguarding
of the family unit' as a significant state interest sufficient to uphold the parental notification statute in
Danforth, but deemed 'the preservation of family integrity' as a significant state interest sufficient to
uphold the parental notification statute in Matheson." Id.
46. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 411.
47. Id.at 412 n.22.
48. Id. at 413. Furthermore, state action which encourages childbirth except in urgent circumstances is" 'rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life.'"
Id. (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980)).
49. Id. at 412. The Court noted that time may be of the essence. Id.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1988

7

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 24 [1988], Iss. 2, Art. 2
TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 24:189

The Court distinguished Matheson from Danforth and Bellotti I1 by

holding that, unlike a parental consent statute, a mere parental notification statute does not unduly burden a minor's right to obtain an abor-

tion."

Arguably, however, parental notice does burden her right of

privacy by revealing the context of a confidential consultation with her

physician, effectively cancelling her right to avoid disclosure of a personal decision and potentially limiting the effectuation of her decision.5 1
C. Mandatory Waiting Periods
The Supreme Court addressed a new issue in City of Akron v. Akron

Centerfor Reproductive Health52 when it held unconstitutional a requirement that a woman wait twenty-four hours before obtaining an abortion
after giving informed and written consent to the procedure.5 3 The Court

found that the waiting period was "arbitrary and inflexible" and did not
serve to further any legitimate state interest. 4 No evidence had been
presented that a waiting period increased the safety of the procedure or
contributed to the making of an informed decision. 5 The state, therefore, may not demand that a woman delay the effectuation of her decision when she is fully informed and prepared to proceed with the

abortion.

6

Although the statute pertained to minor girls as well as ma-

ture adult women, the Court did not address the applicability of the waiting period to minors, even though it acknowledged the "unique status of
children under the law" and the "significant interest" the state has in
57
protecting them.
In Planned ParenthoodAssociation v. Ashcroft,5 8 decided the same
day as Akron, the Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality of the
50. Id. at 411 n.17.
51. Id. at 437-38 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973);
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688
(1977)).
52. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
53. Id. at 449. The Court also held invalid a provision of the statute requiring that a pregnant
girl under the age of 15 obtain either written consent of a parent or guardian, or a court order
authorizing the abortion. Id. at 442. The Court thus reaffirmed Danforth and Bellotti 11 and ruled
that the city of Akron could not make a blanket determination that all minors under the age of 15
are too immature to make the decision or that an abortion would never be in their best interest. Id. at
440.
54. Id. at 450. However, Justice O'Connor, in her dissent, stated that the waiting period was
reasonably related to the state's interest in ensuring that the woman does not make the stressful
abortion decision in haste. Id. at 474 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 450.
56. Id. at 450-51.
57. Id. at 427-28 n.10.
58. 462 U.S. 476 (1983), aff'g in part, rev'g in part, 655 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1981).
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judicial alternative provision of a Missouri parental consent statute and

found it valid.59 Following the Bellotti II requirements, 60 the Court
found that the statute provided confidential and expeditious proceedings
in which the minor could circumvent the parental consent requirement. 6 '
Furthermore, the decision affirmed the appellate court's holding that a
court may only deny a minor's petition "for good cause" if the evidence

indicates that she is not mature enough to make the decision for herself.62 Thus, the Court protected the minor against an "absolute, and

possibly arbitrary" veto found impermissible in Danforth. 3
IV. THE ZBARAZ DECISION
In Hartiganv. Zbaraz, an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed,
in a memorandum decision, the holding of the Seventh Circuit that a
twenty-four hour waiting period violates a minor's right to obtain an
abortion. According to the Seventh Circuit court, the judicial alternative
to parental notification does not sufficiently ensure expeditious and anonymous proceedings for an appeal of the court's decision. 65 The court
severed the waiting-period provisions of the Illinois Parental Notice of
Abortion Act of 1983 and permanently enjoined their enforcement. The
court temporarily enjoined enforcement of the remainder of the Act until
the Illinois Supreme Court promulgated rules assuring the confidential
and expeditious disposition of the waiver of notice proceedings at trial
and on appeal.6 6
A.

Twenty-four Hour Waiting Period
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that a parental

59. Id. at 493. The Court acknowledged that the relevant legal standards with respect to parental consent requirements were not in dispute since a state's interest in protecting minors could
sustain such requirements so long as an alternative was made available to the minor. Id. at 490-91.
The issue here was simply whether the Missouri statute provided a judicial alternative consistent
with the established legal standards. Id. at 491-92.
60. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979). The proceeding "must assure that a resolution of the
issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition
to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained." Id.
61. The statute assured confidentiality by allowing the minor to use only her initials on the

petition. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 491 n.16 (citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982)). The
statute also provided a definite time frame for appeal and required that the supreme court of the state
expedite appellate review of the case. Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.028.2(6) (Supp. 1982).
62. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 493 (citing Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643-44, 647-48 (1979)).
63. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
64. 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987), aff Igper curiam, 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985).
65. Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1538, 1542, 1544 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd per curiam, 108
S. Ct. 479 (1987).
66. Id. at 1545.
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notification statute furthers the significant state interest in promoting parental consultation with a minor if she is immature or if an abortion
would not be in her best interest.67 However, the court also noted that a
"plethora" of decisions have struck down provisions requiring waiting
periods because of the "direct and substantial burden" they place on a
woman's fundamental right to have an abortion. 8 Furthermore, the
69
court found that the burden is the same for minors as it is for adults,
and because abortion is a fundamental right, the state must prove that
the statute is "narrowly drawn to further a compelling interest.170 The
court held that since parental notification is sufficient to further the state
objective of promoting parental consultation, the addition of a
mandatory waiting period created a statute which was broader than necessary to accomplish the state's goals. 7' Consequently, the court held the
provision of the Act which imposed a twenty-four hour waiting period to
be unconstitutional.
The court rejected the defendant's argument that the waiting period
was not mandatory, and therefore not unconstitutionally burdensome,
since the Act provided exceptions by which the minor could avoid the
brief delay. Section 7 of the Act permitted the minor to waive the requirement if she was either accompanied to the abortion facility by both
of her parents or if she submitted a signed, notarized statement from her
parents indicating that they had been notified of her decision.7 ' However, the court found that rather than alleviating the burden, the exceptions increased it threefold by adversely affecting not only the minor, but
also her parents.7 3 Furthermore, section 7 did not provide an exception
for those minors whose parents had been notified and approved of her
decision, but chose not to exercise either of the options provided for by
67. Id. at 1536.
68. Idrat 1536-37. The court discussed Women's Medical Center v. Roberts, 530 F. Supp.
1136, 1146 (D.R.I. 1982), which stated that a mandatory waiting period combined with scheduling
factors such as doctor availability, work commitments, and sick leave may result in an actual delay
of a week or more and could significantly increase the risk and cost of the procedure. Zbaraz, 763
F.2d at 1537.
69. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1537.
70. Id. (quoting Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 785 (7th Cir. 1980)). See also Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
71. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1538.
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.38, 88-67 (1983). The waiting period could be waived if both parents
were notified of the minor's decision and both either accompanied her to the abortion facility or
submitted signed notarized statements that they had been notified. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1538.
73. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1538.
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section 7.74 Section 7, therefore, not only failed to remedy the constitutional infirmity of the waiting period, but was itself invalid for actually
increasing the burden.
B. JudicialAlternative to Notice
Although section 5 of the Act provided an adequate framework for
the initial waiver of notice hearing, it did not provide a constitutionally
sufficient means of appeal. 76 To be sufficient, the procedure must be an

"established and practical avenue" which does not "rely solely on generally stated principles of availability, confidentiality, and form."7 7 Confi-

dentiality during and after a waiver of notification proceeding "is
essential to ensure that a minor will not be deterred from exercising her

right to hearing [out of] fear that her parents may be notified."'78 Furthermore, since time may be of the essence, the pregnant minor must be
ensured that her case will be heard as quickly as possible. The court
stated that the provision was incomplete until the Illinois Supreme Court
could promulgate specific rules to ensure a confidential and expeditious

waiver hearing and appeal. The constitutionality of the judicial alternative provided for in section 5 would not be determined until that time.7 9
The court remanded the case to the district court to determine "the constitutionality of the waiver of notice proceedings when such rules [were]
enacted." 0
V.

ANALYSIS

Although the Zbaraz court properly enjoined enforcement of the
74. Once notice to a minor's parents has been effected, "the state cannot require that an abortion be delayed ..
" Id. at 1538-39 (quoting Indiana Planned Parenthood v. Pearson, 716 F.2d
1127, 1143 (7th Cir. 1983)).
75. Id. at 1539.
76. Section 5(c) pertained to the initial hearing and provided that the proceedings "shall be
confidential" and that "in no case shall the court fail to rule within 48 hours of the time of application...." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, t 81-65(c) (1983). Section 5(f), however, provided that "[a]n
expedited confidential appeal shall be available, as the [Illinois] Supreme Court provides by rule
.... " and section 5(g) stated that the supreme court should promulgate "regulations necessary to
ensure that proceedings under this Act are handled in an expeditious and confidential manner." Id.
81-65(f)-(g).
77. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1540 (quoting American College of Obstetricians v. Thornburgh, 737
F.2d 283, 297 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)). See also Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 644
(1979) (The judicial alternative "must assure that a resolution of the issue, and any appeals that may
follow, will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained.").
78. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1542.
79. Id. at 1541.
80. Id. at 1545.
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Act pending the Illinois Supreme Court's promulgation of rules assuring
a confidential and expeditious hearing, it erred in finding the twenty-four
hour waiting period unconstitutional as an undue burden on a minor's
right to obtain an abortion. The court's errors were threefold. First, the
court applied the strict scrutiny test 8 ' and incorrectly found that the statute was not narrowly tailored to further only the significant state interest
of encouraging parental consultation when a waiting period was combined with a notification requirement that furthered that interest.8 2 Second, the court failed to give the parents of immature minors an
opportunity to exercise their "constitutionalparentalright against undue,
adverse interference by the State."8 3 Third, the court failed to recognize
that a statute requiring parental notification, followed by a twenty-four
hour waiting period, imposes a lesser burden upon the immature minor
than parental consent statutes previously upheld by the Supreme
Court. 4
A.

The Statute Withstands Strict Scrutiny

The Illinois Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1983 was intended
to involve parents in the abortion decision of their immature, unemancipated, minor daughter.8 The Act did not apply to adult women or
emancipated minors. Furthermore, it provided an avenue for an unemancipated minor to bypass the statute's notification requirement by
appealing to the court for a waiver of notice. 86 Also exempted from the
81. A statute that infringes upon a fundamental right must be justified by a compelling state
interest and be so narrowly drawn that it serves only that legitimate interest. See Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
82. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1538. The court held that a mere notification requirement promotes
the state's interest of parental consultation and is not unduly burdensome as long as it provides an
exception for mature minors and immature minors whose best interests are served by an abortion.
Id. at 1536 (citing City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Asheroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983)).
83. Id. at 1549 (Coffey, J.,dissenting) (quoting Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 639 n.18 (1979)).
84. The Supreme Court has held that the state may implement parental consent statutes so long
as it also provides an alternative means by which the minor may obtain authorization to obtain an
abortion. See, eg., Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Bellotti 11,443 U.S.
622 (1979).
85. The express legislative purpose of the Act is "to further the important and compelling State
interests of: 1) protecting minors against their own immaturity, 2) fostering the family structure and
preserving it as a viable social unit, and 3) protecting the rights of parents to rear children who are
members of their household." ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 38, 81-62(a) (1983). See also supra note 10 for
the definition of "minor" and "emancipated."
86. The minor, appearing in court on her own behalf with a guardian ad litem, may be granted
a waiver of notice if she demonstrates that she is well informed enough to make the decision on her
own or that parental notification would not be in her best interest. If notice is waived, the 24-hour
waiting period is not required. Id. V 81-65(b), (d).
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waiting period were those minors who either were accompanied to the
abortion facility by their parents or submitted notarized statements indicating parental notification.87 Finally, the Act provided exceptions for
minors whose medical condition dictated an immediate emergency abortion. 8 Thus, the waiting period pertained only to those unemancipated
minor girls who chose not to exercise the section 7 alternatives to the
waiting period and to those minors who were either too immature to
make the abortion decision or in whose best interest it would be to involve their parents in the decision. These girls would benefit most from
the recognized state interest of "protecting minors against their own immaturity" by promoting parental consultation.89
The Supreme Court has held that the constitutional rights of minors
should not receive less protection than those of adults.90 The Court has
also held that the difference between abortion statutes which regulate
adults and those regulating only minors is that the state may have legitimate interests in protecting minors which would not apply to adults, mature minors, or immature minors whose best interests are contrary to
parental involvement in the abortion decision. 9 1 Because of a minor's
inexperience, presumed vulnerability, and inability to make informed and
mature decisions, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld statutes
that promote parental consultation with an unemancipated minor before
she can obtain an abortion.9 2 Although a state may regulate the activities of minors to protect them from immediate and future harm, the
Court restricts the state by strictly scrutinizing any statute imposing a
direct burden on fundamental rights. 93
The Zbaraz court applied the strict scrutiny test and held that the
statute was not narrowly tailored to further the significant state interest
87. Id. 81-67(a).
88. Id. 81-66.
89. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979). See also supra note 85 for the legislative intent of the
Act.
90. "Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains
the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and
possess constitutional rights." Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (citations

omitted).
91. Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1536 (7th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted), aff'd per
curiam, 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987).
92. Parental participation has been encouraged through notification and consent statutes. See,
e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490-91 (1983), aff'g in part,rev'g in part,
655 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1981); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416,
439 (1983); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 409 (1981); Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979).

93. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
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of parental consultation.9 4 The court stated that parental notification
was sufficient to promote the goal of parental consultation; therefore, the
addition of a mandatory waiting period was unnecessary and overbroad. 95 Assuming the court applied the appropriate level of judicial review, 96 it failed to recognize that mere notification, which could be
accomplished by the physician over the telephone just prior to performing the abortion, 97 does not serve to promote the state interest at all.
There is no assurance that the immature minor will receive any form of
counseling or advice in making an extremely important and irreversible
decision. Only the implementation of a waiting period can increase the
potential of assuring the state that its compelling interests are protected.
If the Supreme Court persists in upholding parental notification
statutes,9 8 thereby denying the minor the right to confidentially exercise
her fundamental right to choose to terminate a pregnancy, it must at
least ensure that some benefit be derived from it. Since parental consultation is the state's desired objective, the Court must allow the state to
implement the least restrictive means necessary to accomplish the goal.
No state interest in parental consultation can possibly be served by telephone notice to the minor's parents just prior to the abortion. But parental notice accompanied by a brief waiting period significantly furthers the
state interest by providing an opportunity for parental consultation, and
does so in a narrowly tailored manner by requiring only a brief delay
rather than parental consent.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Zbaraz, relied heavily on
City of Akron v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health,9 9 a case in which
the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance imposing a twenty-four
94. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1538.
95. Id. at 1538-39.
96. The courts have been inconsistent in the level of scrutiny applied to statutes regulating
minors. The Zbaraz court stated that strict scrutiny should be applied since it was a fundamental
right being burdened. Id. at 1536-37. However, the court acknowledged that a minor's rights are
subject to greater state control than those of adults and wrote in terms of "significant" state interests
to be considered, rather than "compelling" interests. Id. See also Matheson, 450 U.S. at 411-13
(parental notice serves "significant state interest" of parental consultation and is "narrowly drawn to
protect only those interests."); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976) (examined statute for "significant state interest.., not present in the case of an adult."). Compare with
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 n.15 (1977) ("lesser scrutiny" than the compelling interest test is appropriate for minor's privacy interests).
97. "Actual notice" is defined as "giving of notice directly, in person or by telephone." ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 38, %81-63(c) (1983).
98. See, eg., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Note, Zbaraz v. Hartigan: Mandatory
Twenty-Four Hour Waiting PeriodAfter ParentalNotification UnconstitutionallyBurdens a Minor's
Abortion Decision, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1071, 1079 n.57 (1969).
99. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
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hour waiting period on a woman who had given informed, written consent to the abortion. The state has an interest in ensuring that all women
make informed abortion decisions, but the Court ruled that the state
failed to demonstrate that the waiting period furthered this interest;
therefore, the waiting period was an impermissible burden on the woman's right."° The Court stated that if, after counseling, a woman is
prepared to give written consent and proceed with the abortion, the state
may not delay the effectuation of her decision.' Although the Akron
Court stated that "in view of the unique status of children under the
law," the state may have an interest in protecting children that is not
present when the state regulates adults,102 the applicability of the waiting
period to minors was not addressed. Since minors have repeatedly been
recognized as unable to make mature, informed choices about serious
matters, 10 3 a waiting period would logically further the state's desire to
ensure that the minor makes an informed abortion decision.
Unlike the state's interest in Akron,'1 4 the interest in Zbaraz was to
protect unemancipated, pregnant minors from their own immaturity.
Thus, the two cases can be distinguished on the basis that adult women
are presumed capable of making informed, mature decisions, while immature minors are presumed incapable of doing the same. Yet the
Zbaraz court failed to make the critical distinction between a waiting
period held unconstitutional because it applied to all women (including
mature adult women) and one which applied exclusively to immature,
unemancipated minors. Although the Zbaraz court recognized that Akron may not apply to minors and that the Supreme Court has not yet
specifically addressed a similar requirement when applied only to minors,105 it extended the Akron holding because the court found it "apparent" that the Supreme Court's prohibition also extends to statutes
regulating minors only.' 0 6 However, all but one of the cases cited by the
Zbaraz majority in support of its decision involve statutes imposing a
waiting period on mature adult women, not on immature minors
100. Id. at 450. There was no evidence that the abortion would be performed more safely or that
a woman's decision would be more informed after 24 hours. Id.
101. Id. at 450-51.
102. Id. at 427-28 n.10 (citations omitted).
103. See generally Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 633-34 (1979).
104. The state interest in Akron was to ensure that the woman makes an informed decision to
have an abortion. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 450
(1983).
105. Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1535 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd per curiam, 108 S. Ct. 479
(1987).
106. Id. at 1535-36.
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alone. 107
Zbaraz can also be distinguished from H.L. v. Matheson, t0 8 which
upheld a parental notification statute that promoted the state's interest in
encouraging parental consultation without unduly burdening a minor's
right to have an abortion.10 9 The statute in Matheson did not include a
mandatory waiting period, and the Court refused to require a state to
0
"fine-tune its statutes so as to encourage or facilitate abortions.""
Rather, the Court determined that the statute was sufficient to protect
minors by "enhancing the potential for parental consultation."' II In contrast, the state in Zbaraz desired to give substance to its parental notification requirement and attempted to "fine-tune" its statute in order to
ensure that parental consultation can become a reality-not merely enhance the potential for it. Yet the majority prohibited the state from
implementing the most effective and least burdensome means available to
achieve its goal.
B.

The Court Ignores ParentalRights

The court's holding ignores the third objective of the Illinois Act: to
protect the right of parents to rear children who are members of their
household. 1 2 The Supreme Court has stated that constitutional interpretation recognizes that parental authority within the family to direct
' 3
the rearing of their children is "basic to the structure of our society." 1
This right is closely related to the state's interest in protecting minors,
and both interests are commonly furthered by requiring parental consent
for the minor's involvement in important decisions." 4 One important
justification for the state's deference to parents is the parents' right and
duty to instill in their child the political, ethical, or religious beliefs
which the state cannot do in a society "committed to the ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice.""1 5
Since abortion is a fundamental right, the state must act with sensitivity in legislating parental involvement. The Court has already held
107. Id. at 1554 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
108. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
109. Id. at 413.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 412 (emphasis added).
112. See supra note 85.
113. Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1549 (7th Cir. 1985) (Coffey, J., dissenting) (quoting
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 108 S.Ct. 479 (1987)).
114. BellotiI, 443 U.S. 622, 637 (1979).
115. Id. at 637-38.
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that a parental notification requirement does not unduly burden the
rights of an immature minor or one whose best interests are not served by
an abortion. 1 6 But mere notification without a brief waiting period does
not assure parents that their rights are protected. They must be given an
opportunity to exercise their constitutional right to counsel and give
emotional support to their immature minor daughter if they so choose.
This can only be accomplished if the minor is required to wait twentyfour hours after the parents have been notified. 17
Section 7 of the Act serves to promote the state's compelling interest
in protecting the rights of parents to rear their children. This provision
exempts the pregnant minor from the waiting period if she is either accompanied by both of her parents or submits a signed, notarized statement in which the parents have acknowledged the abortion decision. In
either case, the parents' actions imply that the girl has informed them of
her plans, that they have had an opportunity to discuss her decision with
her, and that they agree to assist her in effectuating her decision. Thus,
section 7 serves to protect the immature minor from making an uninformed choice while also advancing the parents' right to participate in
their minor daughter's abortion decision.
C. A Waiting Period is Less Burdensome than Consent
Finally, the court failed to recognize that a twenty-four hour waiting
period after parental notification imposes a lesser burden upon the minor's right than the parental consent statutes which the Supreme Court
has consistently upheld. In Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft,11 the Court upheld a parental consent statute as being justified by
important state and parental interests. 11 9 Yet, in doing so, the Court
imposed "a permanent impediment" 2 to a minor's abortion right unless
she exercised her right to appeal to the court for alternative authorization
116. See, ag., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981).
117. It is important to recognize that parental notification followed by a brief waiting period is

not tantamount to parental consent or parental veto. The minor may still effectuate her abortion
decision over her parents' objections; she merely must wait one day to do so. However, if the parents

discuss the minor's decision with her, she will potentially act with a greater understanding of the
consequences of the procedure.
118. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
119. Id. at 493. The Court stated that "[a] State's interest in protecting immature minors will
sustain a requirement of a consent substitute, either parental or judicial," as long as alternative
procedures are available to allow her to avoid parental veto. Id. at 490-91.
120. Brief for Appellants at 49, Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 108 S.Ct. 479 (1987) (No. 85-673).
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and prevailed in her attempt to circumvent the required parental consent. The minor might possibly never obtain an abortion. Thus, a parental consent requirement imposes a very direct and substantial burden
upon a minor's constitutional rights; yet the Court has found that this
burden is permissible. In contrast, a statute requiring mere parental notification followed by a brief waiting period does not impose such an onerous burden. The minor need not obtain permission, so she may still
effectuate her decision to have an abortion over her parents' objections.
She is required to wait one day after notification, but she is not required
to surrender her right to obtain an abortion. The Court's decision is,
therefore, inconsistent with Ashcroft.
VI.

JUSTICE KENNEDY'S POSSIBLE IMPACT ON FUTURE DECISIONS

The significance of the Zbaraz decision lies in the fact that an
equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Since that decision, the United States Senate confirmed the appointment of Anthony Kennedy to fill the Supreme Court seat vacated
by Justice Lewis Powell, Jr. 2 ' Although Justice Kennedy wrote more
than 430 opinions during his twelve years as a Ninth Circuit judge and
underwent extensive questioning by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, his stance on such issues as civil rights, women's rights, and the right
of privacy is still somewhat uncertain. 122 Because Justice Kennedy
would provide the "swing" vote in a case similar to Zbaraz, an understanding of his judicial philosophy
is important in order to predict the
2 3
impact of his appointment.
A.

JudicialPhilosophy

Justice Kennedy agrees that a description of his judicial philosophy
as "conservative" and "unlikely to accept doctrines which substantially
t24
expand the role of the courts" is "probably apt as a general rule."'
121. See supra note 8.
122. Williams, The Opinions of Anthony Kennedy, No Time for Ideology, A.B.A. J., March 1,
1988, at 56.
123. On August 8, 1988, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld as constitutional a Minnesota statute requiring that a minor seeking an abortion give 48-hours notice to her parents. Hodgson
v. State, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988). The decision followed an en banc rehearing of the court's
previous holding that the statute was unconstitutional. Hodgson v. State, 827 F.2d 1191 (8th Cir.),
reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 835 F.2d 1545 (8th Cir. 1987). Although petition for certiorari
has not yet been filed, Hodgson indicates the existence of cases similar to Zbaraz which may eventually reach the Supreme Court.
124. Change, But Not for the Sake of Change, Legal Times, Dec. 7, 1987, at 21, col. 1. Judge
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Although he acknowledges the necessity of change and continued constitutional interpretation, he stresses that the Constitution must be considered in light of the framers' intent, legal precedent, and the traditions and
values of our society.12 Our understanding of the Constitution changes
with each generation's new insights and perspectives, and Justice Kennedy has stated that he believes that the framers intended the Constitua better society through continued interpretation and
tion to 1 create
26
change.
Judge Kennedy's Ninth Circuit record has been described as both
adhering to and ignoring judicial precedent. His approach in criminal
law has been characterized as using judicial restraint and "adher[ing]
strictly to Supreme Court and 9th Circuit precedent, even where the application of precedent leads to possibly unsatisfactory results."1' 27 How-

ever, he has also been criticized for ignoring Supreme Court precedent
and standards in his holdings regarding the civil rights of women and

minorities under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.128 Although Kennedy
has stated that stare decisis ensures "impartiality" and "stability" of the

law,' 29 Justice Kennedy voted with a 5-4 majority 30 to hear reargument

I to determine whether Runyan v.
of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union 31
McCrary,132 a well-established civil rights case, should be reconsidered.
Kennedy discussed his views on constitutional interpretation in a February 1984 speech given to the
Sacramento Rotary Club.
125. Id.
126. JudgeKennedy: 'Wise Restraints Make Us Free,' Legal Times, Nov. 16, 1987, at 14, col. I.
Judge Kennedy's remarks were made as a panel member discussing the role of courts in constitutional interpretation at an August 1987 conference of Ninth Circuit judges.
127. Green, Justice Kennedy Might Not Meet Expectations of Administration, NAT'L L. J., Dec.
21, 1987 at 20, col. 2.
128. See generally THE NATION INSTITUTE, JUDGE KENNEDY'S RECORD, THE SUPREME
COURT WATCH PROJECT'S ANALYSIS OF THE JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF JUDGE ANTHONY M. KENNEDY (A. Feinberg ed. 1987); Statement ofFederationof Women Lawyers' JudicialScreening Panel

on the Nomination of Anthony M, Kennedy before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Statement of Susan Deller Ross, Professor of Law, Georgetown
University Law Center on Behalf of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund on the Nomination
of Judge Anthony M, Kennedy to the Supreme Court of the United States before the Committee on
the Judiciary, United States Senate, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987).
129. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, NOMINATION OF ANTHONY M. KENNEDY TO BE AN
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, EXEC. REP. No. 100-13, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1988) [hereinafter NOMINATION].
130. Justice Kennedy joined in the per curiam opinion with Justices O'Connor, Scalia, White,

and Rehnquist.
131. 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 108 S.Ct. 65 (1987), restoredto calenderfor
reargument, 108 S.Ct. 1419 (1988) (claim of workplace harassment, unlike claims of discriminatory
hiring, firing, or promotion, is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
132. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). The 7-2 Court held in Runyan that it is "well established" that 42
U.S.C. § 1981 "prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts,"
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Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, stated that reconsidering the Runyan
decision "is neither restrained, nor judicious, nor consistent with the accepted doctrine of stare decisis." 13 3 Justice Kennedy's vote in Patterson
apparently undermines his professed views of stare decisis.
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary determined upon review of
Judge Kennedy's judicial record that he "adheres to" the tenets of judicial restraint which dictate that judges decide only the issues of a case
which are vital to its resolution.134 His general approach is to focus specifically on those vital issues and, where possible, to avoid constitutional
questions.135 According to Kennedy, the proper role of a judge is to interpret the law by applying the principles established under the Constitution and ignoring personal philosophies regarding desirable or "just"

social policies. 136
Constitutional law binds the courts in announcing constitutional
doctrine.' 37 Thus, the courts must differentiate between the essential
rights that should exist in a just society and those essential rights that
exist under our constitutional system. 138 Only those fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution can be enforced; the rights or policies
that are merely desirable in a just society should not be addressed. Thus,
at the core of the constitutional interpretation controversy is the question
of whether rights must be enumerated in order to be afforded protection.
Therefore, understanding Justice Kennedy's views on unenumerated
rights is imperative.
B. Right of Privacy
Justice Kennedy believes that fundamental rights exist which the
"liberty clause" of the Constitution serves to protect from governmental
interference, and that the rights of the liberty clause need not be specifically enumerated for the people to enjoy that protection.' 39 The role of
the courts is to identify the "waivering line" between the rights of the
thereby determining that § 1981 prohibits the exclusion from private schools of qualified children
solely because they are black. Id. at 168.
dissenting).
133. Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 1421 (Blackmun, J.,
134. NOMINATION, supra note 129, at 11, 52.
135. Id. at 52.
136. Id.
137. Address by Judge Anthony M. Kennedy, Unenumerated Rights and the Dictates of Judicial Restraint, Canadian Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, The Stanford Lectures, at 3 (July 24 Aug. 1,1986).
138. Id. at 13.
139. NOMINATION, supra note 129, at 17-18. Judge Kennedy was referring to the due process
clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
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individual and the state in order to demarcate the "protected zone of
liberty. ' ' 14°
Although Kennedy includes the value of privacy within the zone of
liberty protected by the substantive component of the due process clause,
he believes the courts are still in an evolutionary stage of defining the
extent of that right. 141 In determining the extent of constitutional protection for private consensual activities, Kennedy has suggested several
factors to consider and balance against the interests of the state. The
factors include such subjective norms as "the essentiality of the right to
human dignity,... the harm... [and] anguish to the person, the inability of the person to manifest his or her own personality, . . . [and] the
inability of a person not to reach his or her own potential."1'42 These
factors must be balanced against the interests asserted by the state. Kennedy contends that state interests include the deference and respect the
court owes to the legislative process which is itself "an interpreter of the
43
Constitution." 1
Although Kennedy never addressed the right of privacy in the abortion context as a Ninth Circuit judge, he did address the right of privacy
and its relation to private, consensual homosexual conduct. In Beller v.
Middendorf,"4 Judge Kennedy upheld as constitutional a Navy regulation which required the discharge of any member, regardless of the individual's fitness for service, for engaging in homosexual activity. 145 The
Belier holding was characteristically narrow, as Kennedy avoided the
crucial question of whether private, consensual, homosexual conduct is a
fundamental right and instead, addressed the case from a substantive due
process approach rather than from an equal protection approach.' 4 6
Kennedy acknowledged that there is "substantial academic comment"
which argues that the personal decision to engage in homosexual conduct
may be entitled to recognition as a fundamental right and should be protected "as an aspect of the right of privacy."' 47 Yet he rejected the fundamental rights analysis-which he recognized was firmly established by
140. Id.
141.

Id. at 21.

142. Id. at 22.
143. Id.
144. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
145. Id. at 812. Kennedy, however, attempted to distance himself from the harshness of the
holding by stating that upholding the regulations "'is distinct from a statement that they are wise."
Id.
146. Id. at 807. Kennedy stated that the appeals were not presented as impacting a suspect or
quasi-suspect class; therefore, equal protection analysis did not apply. Id.
147. Id. at 809.
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Roe v. Wade 14 8 -in favor of a case-by-case balancing approach for substantive due process scrutiny. 4 9
Judge Kennedy conceded that private, consensual, homosexual conduct should be granted a "heightened solicitude,"1 50 yet he uncritically
accepted the interests asserted by the Navy for implementing and enforcing its blanket rule against homosexual activity by service personnel." 1

In essence, Kennedy gave little or no scrutiny to the Navy regulation,
relying instead upon the philosophy that the special needs and demands

of the military may infringe upon rights or activities that "might" be
protected in another context.15 2 Thus, Belier supports Justice Kennedy's
advocacy of deference to the legislative process (albeit Navy regulation in
this case) and his adherence to the demands of the tenets of judicial
restraint.

Although an analysis of Belier, standing alone, cannot predict Justice Kennedy's stance on abortion and the issues posed in Hartigan v.
Zbaraz, his dissent in United States v. Penn153 adds substance to a
Zbaraz prediction. Judge Kennedy emphatically asserted that a police
officer's bribe of a child "who has not [yet] reached the age of reason" was

a severe intrusion into the intimate mother-child relationship."

4

Although Kennedy did not explicitly mention the right of privacy, he
relied in part on Moore v. City of East Cleveland 55 and Pierce v. Society
148. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
149. Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 807-08 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905
(1981).
150. Id. at 810. Kennedy stated that the case lay somewhere between the compelling state interest test of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), used for matters at the "core of interests which deserve
due process protection" and the test requiring a "rational relation to a legitimate government interest" which usually serves to uphold the regulation. Belier, 632 F.2d at 808-09.
dissenting from denial of rehear151. Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80, 90 (9th Cir.) (Norris, J.,
ing en banc), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
152. Belier, 632 F.2d at 811-12.
153. 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980). Police officers, searching for heroin, entered a house with a valid search warrant. When they were unable to find any
heroin, one of the officers offered the owner's five-year-old son five dollars if he would show them
where the "little balloons" were hidden. The child did, and the officers discovered the heroin. The
majority of the Ninth Circuit court found that the bribe did not violate the fifth amendment due
process clause.
dissenting) (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 888 (Kennedy, J.,
155. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). The Court struck down an ordinance limiting housing occupancy to
members of a single family, thereby protecting the sanctity of the family and family choices.
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of Sisters,'56 and maintained that the parent-child union has a "funda-

mental place" in our culture. 5 7 Thus, as an "essential liberty," the par158
ent-child relationship must be protected from disruption.
C. Abortion Waiting-PeriodStatutes
After considering Justice Kennedy's approach to judicial review, his
beliefs concerning fundamental rights, and the importance he places on
the parent-child union, one might conclude that Justice Kennedy would
join the dissenters in Hartigan v. Zbaraz and declare the twenty-four
hour waiting period constitutional. Of the factors considered, the most
compelling is Justice Kennedy's fervent belief in the parent-child union
as a fundamental relationship to be protected against state interference.
The articulated goals of the Illinois Parental Notice of Abortion Act of
1983 include protecting the minor from her own immaturity and protecting the rights of parents to rear the children who are in their household. 5 9 These goals are in direct accord with Justice Kennedy's views of
the family, and he would almost certainly be responsive to a statute
which ensured that a parent's rights and an immature, dependent minor's health and well-being are protected. Justice Kennedy would likely
advocate that the sanctity of the parent-child union can best be preserved
and encouraged by requiring that the physician give the parents notice
twenty-four hours before performing an abortion on their immature, minor pregnant daughter-not merely telephone notice five minutes prior
to the procedure as the statute would otherwise permit. Thus, the state's
interest in enhancing parental consultation, the parents' right to direct
the rearing of their child, and the minor's right to obtain an abortion are
balanced.
Justice Kennedy's judicial philosophy also suggests that he would
find the waiting period constitutional. Although his respect for judicial
precedent is arguable," r ° he would likely adhere to Supreme Court precedent when it preserves a fundamental right. The Court recognizes the
156. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The Court held that the right of privacy encompasses the parents'
right to direct the rearing of their children. The Court thus struck an ordinance requiring parents to
send their children to public school.
157. Penn, 647 F.2d at 888 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 889.
159. See supra note 85.
160. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
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important interest parents have in consulting with their child in the abortion decision, and has furthered that interest by upholding parental consent and notification statutes.16 1 Justice Kennedy might well follow this
precedent and interpret a twenty-four hour waiting period as furthering
the state interest by ensuring that the opportunity for consultation is
available. However, to do so would seem to require a rejection of the
Court's holding that a waiting period is unconstitutional. 162 This can be
avoided by arguing that previous holdings were in response to statutes
which pertained not only to minors, but also to adult women who would
not benefit from waiting twenty-four hours after making a mature and
informed decision. 163 Therefore, the statutes were unconstitutional as a
burden upon a woman's abortion right, and the Court struck down the
statutes without considering their applicability to minors. Until Zbaraz,
the Supreme Court had not addressed a statute requiring a waiting period for minors only. Thus, Kennedy could uphold the twenty-four hour
waiting period without rejecting Supreme Court precedent.
Justice Kennedy's adherence to judicial restraint suggests that he
would address only the vital issue of Zbaraz: whether the twenty-four
hour waiting period is constitutional. Thus, he would perhaps avoid any
consideration or discussion of whether there is a protected right to obtain
an abortion or whether a minor's right of privacy precludes the validity
of a parental notification requirement. Justice Kennedy would likely
vote to uphold the Act, leaving the underlying issues for future consideration as they arise. Furthermore, his deference to the legislature as an
interpreter of the Constitution would allow him to consider the valid legislative intent behind the Act, and, finding it in accord with his own belief in protecting the sanctity of the parent-child union, uphold the
twenty-four hour waiting period.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Zbaraz v. Hartigancourt failed to recognize that its holding not
only imposed a burden upon a minor's right to privacy by upholding a
parental consent requirement, but also denied the minor and her parents
the opportunity to derive any benefit from the imposition by striking the
161.
162.
163.
curtam,

See, e.g., BellottiII, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
See, eg., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1554 (7th Cir. 1985) (Coffey, J., dissenting), aff'dper
108 S. Ct. 479 (1987).
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waiting-period provision. That the court would, on the one hand, support a requirement which would invade a minor's ight of privacy by
requiring that her parents be notified of her abortion decision, and on the
other hand fail to uphold the only requirement that could most narrowly
further the state interest in protecting its immature minors, as well as the
parents' rights, seems incongruous. The twenty-four hour waiting period
does not become a veto of the minor's decision, since the girl need not
obtain parental consent. She need merely wait one additional day before
effectuating her decision.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court issued only a memorandum opinion in affirming the Seventh Circuit decision in Zbaraz. The opinion indicates neither ihe reasoning used to reach the decision nor the
composition of the affirming members of the Court. However, Justice
Kennedy would probably join the dissenters of the Court and uphold the
statute in Zbaraz. His fervent belief in the sanctity of the parent-child
union indicates that he would advocate the enhanced parental consultation afforded by a brief waiting period. Furthermore, the legitimate legislative goals of the Act would enable him to give proper deference to the
legislative process. Thus, Justice Kennedy's vote would uphold a constitutionally fit statute requiring that an immature, dependent minor seeking an abortion wait twenty-four hours after parental notification of her
decision.
Vicky Cooper Hale
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